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A divided Maryland Supreme Court ruled Tuesday that police cannot pull over drivers who are merely touching their cell phones while behind the wheel, actions that could be permitted under the state’s distracted driving laws.
“It is clear that not every driver observed manipulating, or even touching, or pressing the screen of a cell phone while driving can reasonably be suspected of violating the law,” wrote Justice Shirley M. Watts for the majority in the 4-3 ruling.
Maryland’s distracted driving laws prohibit writing, sending or reading a text message behind the wheel, but they do allow for using GPS, calling 911 and other exceptions. As long as there is a possible legal explanation, Watts wrote, police do not automatically have grounds for a traffic stop.
But Justice Steven B. Gould, in a dissent joined by Justices Jonathan Biran and Angela M. Eaves, said the majority’s ruling would have “significant” practical consequences.
“Under the Majority’s analysis, an officer who witnesses a driver commit what could be a criminal offense — such as typing a text message to a friend — cannot conduct an investigatory stop because the officer cannot rule out that the driver was instead pressing the screen to terminate a call or enter a GPS address,” Gould wrote.
The reasonable suspicion that officers need to make a stop “tolerates ambiguity” and allows the stop so police can determine if the action is illegal or innocuous.
“As a result, Maryland’s distracted driving laws have been largely rendered unenforceable before a tragedy occurs—a consequence not compelled by the Fourth Amendment and at odds with the policy judgment that animated the General Assembly’s decision to enact these laws in the first place.”
The decision stems from a 2023 traffic stop of Michael Eugene Stone by two Hagerstown Police officers who said they observed Stone “manipulating” a cell phone attached to his vehicle’s dashboard or windshield after seeing his phone screen brighten.
After the stop, the officers found fentanyl on Stone, leading to his arrest and charge on three counts of unlawful possession of fentanyl. Stone was not charged for distracted driving.
At trial, Stone attempted to suppress the evidence from the vehicle, claiming the search – his attorney said in court that Stone was “effectively strip searched on the side of the road” – was improper.
Stone’s motion was denied by the circuit court judge, who said that even though neither officer claimed that Stone was texting or calling while driving, the simple act of touching a phone warranted reasonable suspicion.
But the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed that ruling in October, concluding that Stone’s actions did not inherently show criminal intent. They determined that the officers did not distinguish whether he was texting or whether he appeared distracted.
“Testimony from the officers describing why they believed [ Stone] was violating traffic laws [was] limited: ‘[I]t appeared like he was typing a message’ and ‘I saw him pressing the screen while driving,” according to the Appellate Court decision.
The Supreme Court on Tuesday agreed. Watts wrote that evidence must go beyond a police officer’s statement of reasonable suspicion – the facts of the case must also be “out of the ordinary” and “rule out a substantial portion of innocent travelers,” she wrote.
In Stone’s case, Watts argued, a singular act of touching a cell phone is ambiguous enough that reasonable suspicion cannot be applied.
“Where a police officer observes a driver manipulating, touching, or pressing the screen of a phone, without additional information, a reasonable and prudent officer would not be justified in conducting a stop to investigate a violation of the traffic laws governing use of a mobile phone while driving,” Watts wrote.
Gould said the majority’s ruling “demands too much of officers” before making a stop.
“By requiring officers to rule out exceptions to the prohibition before making a stop, the Majority’s holding effectively neuters Maryland’s distracted driving statutes as a tool for preventing tragic auto accidents,” Gould wrote.
The Maryland Attorney General’s office, through a spokesperson, declined to comment on the ruling Wednesday.
But Douglas Nivens II, the public defender who represented Stone, praised the Supreme Court’s ruling, saying that officers who conduct stops under reasonable suspicion must “articulate specific facts.”
“This opinion also follows longstanding Federal and Maryland precedent that conduct that a large number of drivers exhibit cannot be the grounds for reasonable, articulable suspicion,” Nivens said in a statement.
“We hope this opinion concludes Mr. Stone’s case so that he can live peacefully without fear of re-imprisonment,” he wrote.
